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JUSTIFYING POWER: 
FEDERALISM, IMMIGRATION, AND 
‘FOREIGN AFFAIRS’ 
ERIN F. DELANEY* 
INTRODUCTION 
Immigration federalism is all the rage. In countries such as the 
United States, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and Spain,1 academics 
and politicians are engaged in heated debates over the best ways to 
create and implement immigration and integration policies across the 
many levels of a federal system.2 But these policy debates are 
constructed and constrained by the background constitutional rules 
that allocate powers in a given federation. In the United States, in 
particular, the allocation to the federal government of power over 
immigration has dramatic implications for how states may, or may not, 
 
* Assistant Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. For their generous assistance 
and suggestions, I am grateful to Joseph Blocher, Catherine Kim, Travis Lenkner, Ralf 
Michaels, Hiroshi Motomura, Tanusri Prasanna, Dana Remus, Kristen Stilt, Ernest Young, the 
participants at the Perspectives on Migration, Governance, and Citizenship Symposium, and the 
Zodiac Group at Northwestern Law School. Linda Nyberg provided excellent research 
assistance. To the editors and staff of the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law amd Public 
Policy, thank you very much for organizing the symposium and inviting me to participate. 
 1.  See, e.g., Joanna Drozdz, Spanish Leadership in Developing a ‘Common’ European 
Immigration Policy: Intergovernmentalist Supranationalization Approach (2011) (unpublished 
Masters thesis, DePaul University), http://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/92. See generally Graeme 
Boushey & Adam Luedtke, Fiscal Federalism and the Politics of Immigration: Centralized and 
Decentralized Immigration Policies in Canada and the United States, 8 J. COMP. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS 207 (2006); Dagmar Soennecken, Germany and the Janus Face of Immigration 
Federalism: Devolution vs. Centralization, in IMMIGRATION REGULATION IN FEDERAL STATES: 
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Sasha Baglay & Delphine 
Nakache eds., forthcoming). 
 2.  Integration policies—which are not explored in this Article—refer to the processes by 
which immigrants are incorporated into society, particularly into labor markets. Immigration 
policy, on the other hand, focuses on questions of entry and exit. See generally MARTIN A. 
SCHAIN, THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION IN FRANCE, BRITAIN, AND THE UNITED STATES: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (2008); Noah Lewin-Epstein et al., Institutional Structure and Immigrant 
Integration: A Comparative Study of Immigrants’ Labor Market Attainment in Canada and 
Israel, 37 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 389 (2003); Anja Wiesbrock, The Integration of Immigrants in 
Sweden: a Model for the European Union?, 49 INT’L MIGRATION 48 (2011).  
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take part in the politics of immigration.3 There is, therefore, a 
particular importance to identifying and understanding the 
constitutional contexts in which these debates occur—the structural 
foundations of immigration federalism. 
In most Western federations, particularly those considered 
countries of immigration, the ex ante constitutional allocations of 
power are set (though, as in the United States, there is certainly 
contestation at the margins). In the quasi-federal European Union, 
however, the current debate is over first principles: Which level of 
government—the Member States or the supranational EU 
institutions—should have the power to regulate immigration, and 
under what rationale? These questions take on a certain immediacy 
due to provisions in the newly ratified Lisbon Treaty that purport to 
structure European immigration federalism. Under Lisbon, individual 
Member States and the supranational European Union now share 
power over immigration regulation, conditioned on a requirement 
that the supranational-level institutions provide reasons justifying 
their efforts to regulate. But what will be considered an acceptable 
justification to preempt or condition Member State action? The 
answer will set the constitutional contours of the EU federalism 
dynamic in immigration, perhaps with implications far into the future. 
To inform the EU debate, this Article looks to the United States 
to provide some comparative insights on first-order federalism issues. 
Although little work has been done in the specific context of 
immigration federalism, comparisons between the European Union 
and the United States are widely accepted, as the European Union is 
understood by many to display elements of a federal system sufficient 
to allow for useful and meaningful comparative analysis.4 As a 
threshold matter, any comparison must identify the correct historical 
 
 3.  See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497, 2510 (2012) (invalidating parts of 
Arizona law S.B. 1070 designed to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of 
aliens” as preempted by federal law); Chamber of Commerce  v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 
(2011) (finding no federal preemption of Arizona law imposing sanctions on businesses 
employing undocumented immigrants).  
 4.  See, e.g., MICHAEL BURGESS, FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN UNION: THE BUILDING 
OF EUROPE, 1950-2000 (2000); LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL 
SOVEREIGNTY: THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT (2001); INTEGRATION 
THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (Mauro Cappelletti et 
al. eds., 1986); THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (Kalypos Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001).  
See generally Dividing and Sharing Power: Lessons for the European Union, 15 REGIONAL & 
FED. STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) (2005). 
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period in the United States in which to situate the analysis.5 In this 
case, it was during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
when the power over immigration was finally (and firmly) allocated 
to the federal government.6 The result—a plenary federal power over 
immigration—and the subsequent historical experience of the United 
States suggest something of a cautionary tale to European Member 
States wary of losing national control over immigration issues. Given 
the differences between the two systems, the European Union is 
unlikely to conform to the American experience in every respect; 
nevertheless, lessons from the United States should encourage 
Member States to interrogate closely the rationales provided by 
supranational institutions to justify their actions. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I opens with a brief 
history outlining the evolution of power over immigration in the 
European Union, from a jealously guarded competence exclusive to 
the Member States to one shared by the Member States and the 
supranational institutions. It then lays out the legal framework 
provided by the Lisbon Treaty, reviews a recent legislative proposal 
made at the supranational level seeking to regulate seasonal workers 
(the “Seasonal Workers Directive”), and analyzes the associated set of 
arguments for supranational action, including a “foreign policy” 
justification. In assessing the claims for and against supranational 
power in this particular European context, certain rationales emerge 
that once were used in American debates. 
Part II begins by demonstrating the relevance of the American 
experience to that of Europe. In the United States, as in Europe under 
the Lisbon Treaty, the locus of immigration power was not clearly 
defined by the Constitution, and broad action by the federal 
government still required justification as late as the 1880s. The U.S. 
Supreme Court ultimately filled this reason-giving role, and Part II 
analyzes the arguments the Court developed, particularly the “foreign 
affairs” rationale for plenary federal power. Part II concludes by 
 
 5.  See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4 (antebellum United States); Erin Delaney, 
Managing in a Federal System Without an ‘Ultimate Arbiter’: Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the EU 
and the Ante-bellum United States, 15 REGIONAL & FED. STUD. 225 (2005); Erin Delaney & 
Luca Barani, The Promotion of ‘Symmetrical’ European Citizenship: A Federal Perspective, 25 J. 
EUR. INTEGRATION 95 (2003) (United States in the 1790s); Robert A. Garson, The Euro? So 
What's New? Federalism, Nationalism and the Adoption of the United States Dollar, 1776-1792, 
in FEDERALISM, CITIZENSHIP AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES IN U.S. HISTORY 9 (Cornelis A. 
van Minnen & Sylvia L. Hilton eds., 2000). 
 6.  See infra Part II.B. 
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identifying the downstream effects of this rationale in Supreme Court 
doctrine and its broader implications for the relationship between the 
states and the federal government in the United States. 
Building on the American experience, Part III returns to the 
European Union and draws a parallel between the “foreign policy” 
justification and the “foreign affairs” rationale. Reviewing the force of 
the foreign affairs rationale in the U.S. context, this Part contends that 
the American experience should concern those Member States 
reluctant to cede power to the European Union. Although power 
over immigration may be shared, the boundaries of action are 
uncertain, and some Member States might prefer to maintain more 
control at the state level, either as a matter of immigration policy or 
as a matter of principle.7 Comparative evidence from the American 
experience suggests these Member States should be particularly 
attentive to the use of the foreign policy justification by the 
supranational institutions. Part III concludes by suggesting a 
procedural mechanism to limit the reach of an all-encompassing 
European foreign policy, or “foreign affairs,” rationale. 
I. CONTESTED POWER: IMMIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
From its earliest incarnation as the European Coal and Steel 
Community, the European integration project has pooled sovereignty 
among European countries in order to achieve shared goals.8 What 
began as a narrow agreement among six countries to create a 
common market in coal and steel has led to a Union of twenty-eight 
nations with an expansive common internal market, open internal 
borders,9 and a shared currency.10 The powerful logic of integration in 
a single European market has resulted in many areas of supranational 
power, and the willingness of Member States to limit their sovereignty 
 
 7.  See infra Part I.B (discussing the problem of “creeping competence”).  
 8.  Speaking before the Bundestag on July 12, 1951, Konrad Adenauer described the 
European Coal and Steel Community as “the first time in history [that] nations were voluntarily 
giving up ‘a portion of their sovereignty’ to a supranational institution—‘an event which 
signifies the end of nationalism . . . which has been the cancer of Europe.’” HENRY L. MASON, 
THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY: EXPERIMENT IN SUPRANATIONALISM 13 
(1955) (citation omitted). 
 9.  Twenty-two Member States of the European Union are members of the border-free 
Schengen Zone. See Member Countries of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/ (last visited May 28, 2013). On the 
Schengen Zone, see infra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
 10.  The Euro is shared among seventeen Member States. See Member Countries of the 
European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/ 
(last visited May 28, 2013). 
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and act in concert has been remarkable.11 Nevertheless, and 
notwithstanding the many areas of power already delegated to 
“Europe,” the debate over the allocation of powers between the 
supranational EU institutions and the Member States is a perennial 
issue in European political life. Immigration, or “migration,” as it is 
referred to in Europe, has long been in the crosshairs of these larger 
structural debates. 
Migration operates against the background principle of the free 
movement of persons, one of the four fundamental freedoms at the 
core of the European integration project.12 The initial understanding 
of this freedom and its reach was tightly connected to the 
development of the common market: There was to be free movement 
of workers who also were nationals of the Member States.13 The free 
movement principle eventually expanded to include all citizens of EU 
Member States, providing them the right to live and work in any EU 
Member State.14 Member States are severely limited in their ability to 
burden this intra-EU movement,15 but they are not similarly 
constrained in relation to third-country nationals (TCNs), who do not 
have free movement rights under European law.16 
 
 11.  Much effort has been spent explicating the dynamics behind European integration, and 
there are a number of competing theories. Classic works on the subject include: ALAN S. 
MILWARD, THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE NATION-STATE (1992) (intergovernmentalism); 
ANDY MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE: SOCIAL PURPOSE AND STATE POWER FROM 
MESSINA TO MASSTRICHT (1998) (intergovernmentalism); ERNST HAAS, THE UNITING OF 
EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC FORCES 1950-1957 (1958) (functionalism); and 
Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal 
Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41 (1993) (neofunctionalism). 
 12.  The other freedoms are the free movement of goods, services, and capital. Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community arts. 3(a), (c), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 
15 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], available at http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic.es/euroconstitution 
/library/historic%20documents/Rome/TRAITES_1957_CEE.pdf. 
 13.  Michelle Everson, The Legacy of the Market Citizen, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF 
EUROPEAN UNION 73 (Jo Shaw & Gillian More eds., 1996). 
 14.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
20(2)(a), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 56 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:0047:0200:EN:PDF. 
 15.  This statement has some qualifications: During negotiations over enlargement, certain 
Member States, fearful of an influx of new workers from Eastern Europe, sought limitations on 
free movement for these new EU citizens. See, e.g., EU-25: Member States Grapple with the Free 
Labour Market, EURACTIV (May 5, 2004), http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/eu-25-
member-states-grapple-free-labour-market/article-117775.  
 16.  The concept of TCNs does not include the stateless, including Europe’s Roma people. 
A discussion of the role of the stateless in immigration federalism is beyond the scope of this 
Article. For more information on this aspect of the immigration debate, see generally Claude 
Cahn & Peter Vermeersch, The Group Expulsion of Slovak Roma by the Beglian Government: 
A Case Study of the Treatment of Romani Refugees in Western Countries, 13 CAMBRIDGE REV. 
INT’L AFF. 71 (2000). On statelessness and human rights, see generally David Weissbrodt & 
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Third-country migration implicates many areas of traditional 
Member State interest—membership and citizenship, language, 
culture, and a nation’s internal labor market—and these concerns 
have largely trumped any competing pressures for Union-wide action. 
For much of the EU’s history, regulating migration from third-
countries was considered a purely national prerogative.17 It was not 
until the late 1990s that the EU’s supranational institutions were 
given power to engage in migration control; since then, supranational 
legislation has primarily engaged with asylum issues and irregular 
migration, only very recently shifting to work-related migration and 
the labor market, the focus of this Article. 
This Part opens with a brief review of the historical development 
toward shared power in migration matters, implemented by the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009. It then turns to the details of the Lisbon Treaty 
itself: Lisbon provides a legal basis for supranational action on 
migration and requires the European institutions to justify such 
action under the principle of subsidiarity, by explaining why the 
relevant issue cannot be resolved appropriately at the Member State 
level. Finally, this Part looks in detail at a recently proposed piece of 
legislation regulating the conditions of entry and residence of TCNs 
for the purposes of seasonal employment—the Seasonal Workers 
Directive. Promulgated under the new Lisbon rules, this proposed 
Directive provided the first opportunity for the European institutions 
and the Member States to debate the supranational role in regulating 
labor-related immigration in the context of shared power. 
A. The Road to Lisbon: A Brief Historical Note 
Shared power over third-country migration would have been 
unthinkable thirty years ago. In fact, “most member-states believed 
that they were completely free regarding immigration law vis-à-vis 
non-[European Community] nationals,”18 and they preferred to 
maintain control at the nation-state level. From a competence 
exclusive to the Member States to one shared between the Member 
States and the supranational institutions, the regulation of migration 
is an example of both the powerful logic of integration and the 
continued importance to the Member States of national culture and 
 
Clay Collins, The Human Rights of Stateless Persons, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 245 (2006). 
 17.  ANDREW GEDDES, THE POLITICS OF MIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE 131 
(2003). 
 18.  GALLYA LAHAV, IMMIGRATION AND POLITICS IN THE NEW EUROPE 40 (2004). 
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national power. 
For many years, Member States not only refused to delegate 
sovereignty to European institutions over third-country migration 
issues but also aggressively guarded Member State power through 
litigation. In 1985, when the European Commission (the Commission) 
proposed an information-sharing procedure related to migration 
policies,19 five of the then ten Member States took the institution to 
court.20 The Member States argued that the Commission lacked 
competence to adopt the measure, as migration was a field within the 
“exclusive jurisdiction” of the Member States. The French Republic 
made the additional argument that “matters relating to the conditions 
of entry, residence and employment of nationals of non-member 
countries affect[ed] the Member States’ security,”21 another area of 
critical national interest. 
The Commission had proposed similar information-sharing 
“communication and consultation” procedures in other substantive 
areas, yet the Member States neither “raised [their] voices [nor their] 
eyebrows” in response.22 But as Advocate General Mancini noted in 
his opinion in support of the Commission, “the Member States are . . . 
vitally . . . interested in preserving full control over the admission to 
their territory of workers from non-member countries, inter alia 
because of its obvious political and public-policy ramifications.”23 The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) produced a delicately constructed 
opinion, invalidating much of the procedure while saving some of the 
consultation mechanisms.24 But no consultations ever occurred.25 
Contemporaneous to this litigation, the Member States were 
negotiating an expansive new treaty arrangement under the Single 
European Act (SEA). The SEA promised the completion of the 
common market, describing it as “an area without internal frontiers in 
 
 19.  The European Commission is the supranational body responsible for proposing 
European legislation. See infra note 35 for a discussion of the legislative process in the 
European Union.  
 20.  Joined Cases 281, 283–85, & 287/85, Germany v. Comm’n, 1987 E.C.R. 3203. In 
addition to Germany, the suing states included the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom, 
and Denmark.  
 21.  Id. ¶ 9. Article 118 of the EEC Treaty gave the Commission “the task of promoting 
closer cooperation between Member States in the social field.” EEC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 
118, at 96.  
 22.  Opinion of Advocate General Mancini, Germany v. Comm’n, 1987 E.C.R. 3219, 3223. 
 23.  Id. at 3229. 
 24.  Germany v. Comm’n, 1987 E.C.R. 3203, 3252–53, ¶¶ 23, 27.  
 25.  GEDDES, supra note 17, at 131. 
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which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured.”26 The Member States were careful in negotiations to 
maintain exclusive power over immigration,27 but the logic of the 
internal market and freedom of movement would eventually 
“stimulate[] a tendency towards greater cooperation and 
coordination” in the field.28 
Rather than using the European Union (then Community) 
institutions to pass legislation, Member States chose to work together 
in transnational groupings, often completely outside the Union 
framework. Negotiating among themselves, Member States created 
the Schengen Agreement on removing internal borders29 and adopted 
the Dublin Convention on streamlining asylum claims.30 The creation 
of the Schengen Area (or Zone) in 1985 facilitated the free movement 
of those already permitted to live and work in the signatory states and 
changed the nature of travel in much of Europe. Note, however, that 
the existence of open internal borders between certain EU Member 
States did not in itself provide any general right to free movement; 
TCNs continue to be admitted to a single Member State and may not 
transfer that admission right to gain entry to another Member State. 
That TCNs must seek admission seriatim has particular salience in the 
context of asylum—a fact that led some Member States to negotiate 
the Dublin Convention (ratified in 1990).31 Member States were 
concerned about perceived forum-shopping by asylees seeking the 
most advantageous welfare benefits, frustrated by the possibility that 
an applicant, after being denied by one Member State, could keep 
reapplying for asylum in other Member States, and solicitous of those 
countries facing increased migration due to their location on the 
 
 26.  Single European Act art. 13, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 7 [hereinafter SEA] 
(amending the EEC Treaty), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/ 
documents/treaties/singleuropeanact.pdf. 
 27.  See id. arts. 13, 19, at 9, 12; Single European Act, Political Declaration by the 
Governments of the Member-States on the Free Movement of Persons,  Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. 
(L 169) 1, 26; see also Opinion of Advocate General Mancini, Germany v. Comm’n, 1987 E.C.R. 
3219, 3229 (discussing Member State actions in negotiations over the SEA). 
 28.  GRETE BROCHMANN, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND IMMIGRATION FROM THIRD 
COUNTRIES 77 (1996). 
      29.     Schengen Acquis, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:239:0001:0473:EN:PDF. 
 30.  Council Regulation 343/2003, on Asylum Applications by Third-Country Nationals, 
2003 O.J. (L 50) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:L:2003:050:0001:0010:EN:PDF; see also LAHAV, supra note 18, at 44. 
 31.  See generally Agnès Hurwitz, The 1990 Dublin Convention: A Comprehensive 
Assessment, 11 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 646 (1999). 
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borders of the Union. Created outside the EU framework, the 
Schengen Area and the Dublin Convention were not initially part of 
the European acquis, thus Member States were not required to join 
and some Member States chose to opt-out.32 
By the early 1990s, Member States recognized the need for a more 
comprehensive approach, committing themselves through the 
Maastricht Treaty to collective action in asylum and migration 
matters.33 But again, cooperation was to come through strictly 
intergovernmental, rather than communitarian, means.34 Maastricht, 
or the Treaty on European Union, created an unusual system that 
divided subject matters into three groupings, or pillars. The internal 
market was placed in the First Pillar and was subject to what has 
become known as the “Community method” of lawmaking. This 
method makes use of the communitarian institutions: The 
Commission proposes a law, which is then debated, amended, and 
voted on by both the Council of Ministers (Council) and the 
European Parliament.35 Voting in the Council is by qualified majority 
 
 32.  In general, European Union law is valid in all Member States without reservation. 
However, a handful of Member States have negotiated “opt-outs” that entitle them to choose 
not to participate in certain policy areas, such as the Schengen Area or the eurozone. Ireland 
and the United Kingdom are the only Member States that have opted-out from Schengen, and 
not without controversy. Julian J.E. Schutte, UK v. EU: A Continuous Test Match, 34 
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1346, 1355 (2011); see also Daniel Mason, Schengen Opt-Out Damaging 
UK Economy, PUBLIC SERVICE EUROPE (July 29, 2011), http://www.publicserviceeurope.com 
/article/680/schengen-opt-out-damaging-uk-economy. For a general discussion of this system of 
opt-outs—referred to as a “multispeed” or “two-speed” European Union—see generally JEAN-
CLAUDE PIRIS, THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: TOWARDS A TWO-SPEED EU? (2012).  
 33.  Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1 [hereinafter Maastricht 
TEU], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1992:224:0001: 
0130:EN:PDF. 
 34.  All institutions of the European Union are considered supranational; they lie on a 
spectrum between communitarian and intergovernmental. The key institutions considered 
communitarian are the Commission, the European Parliament, and the ECJ, all thought to have 
strong commitments to continuing the European integration project and to European Union 
norms, separate and distinct from the interests, or aggregated interests, of the Member States. 
In contrast, the Council of Ministers, in which Member States have equal representation, 
functions as an intergovernmental institution, particularly when operating under unanimity 
rules. For a description of the law-making process, see infra note 35. The European Council is a 
distinct body of Member State heads of government that sets the EU’s political agenda but has 
no power to pass legislation. 
 35.  This method, formerly known as the “co-decision procedure,” was renamed the 
“ordinary legislative procedure” by the Lisbon Treaty. The lawmaking procedure vests equal 
authority in the Council and the Parliament and is the main method by which EU laws are 
promulgated. First, the Commission drafts the text of a proposed piece of legislation, which the 
Parliament reviews and suggests changes to in a so-called “first reading.” After the Commission 
considers the Parliament’s suggestions and revises the text, the Council makes its own first 
reading and adopts a common position on the text. The common position is then sent to the 
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voting (QMV), rather than unanimity, so no one Member State can 
serve as a veto point. Furthermore, the ECJ is given jurisdiction to 
interpret the law. In contrast, the Second and Third Pillars were 
designed to be intergovernmental. In intergovernmental issues, the 
Member States, represented in the Council and acting under the 
principle of unanimity, make collective decisions about possible action 
without formal input from the Commission or Parliament, and 
without threat of judicial review. The Maastricht Treaty placed Justice 
and Home Affairs, which included asylum and immigration, in the 
intergovernmental Third Pillar. Thus, border crossing by TCNs 
remained “one of the last strongholds of [Member State] 
sovereignty.”36 
In the late 1990s, the Amsterdam Treaty cracked the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Member States over immigration by authorizing a 
major shift: Five years after ratification, asylum and immigration 
issues would move from the intergovernmental Third Pillar to the 
communitarian First Pillar of the Union system. At that time, the 
Commission would have competence to introduce legislation on some 
migration issues, subject to a unanimity requirement in the Council.37 
Notwithstanding this apparent shift, the Member States also created, 
through the Council, an intergovernmental working group on asylum 
and migration issues designed to complement (at best) or undermine 
(at worst) the Commission’s nascent role.38 
 
Parliament along with a statement of reasons. Parliament then conducts its second reading 
within three months of receiving the Council’s common position, at which point it can accept it, 
reject it, or propose amendments. If the Parliament approves the text or simply takes no action 
at all, the Council must adopt that version of the law. If the Parliament rejects the text, the act is 
vetoed; if it amends the text, the Council can agree to the changes (and thus adopt the act) or 
reject them. If the Council rejects the changes, the proposed legislation is brought before a 
Conciliation Committee, composed of an equal number of representatives from the Council and 
the Parliament, which has six weeks to approve a joint text before the act is deemed dead. If the 
Committee does manage to come to an agreement, the text of the law is sent to the Parliament 
and the Council for their respective third reading. Both institutions must approve the text within 
six weeks, at which point it finally becomes law. If either institution fails to do so, the act lapses. 
TFEU, supra note 14, art. 294, at 173–75. 
 36.  Emek M. Uçarer, Guarding the Borders of the European Union: Paths, Portals, and 
Prerogatives, in MIGRATION AND THE EXTERNALITIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 15, 28 
(Sandra Lavenex & Emek M. Uçarer eds., 2002). 
 37.  Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts arts. 63–64, Oct. 2, 1997, 
1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, 29–30 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam], available at http://www.lexnet.dk 
/law/download/treaties/Ams-1997.pdf. 
 38.  The High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration was designed to take action 
in those areas scheduled to be transferred to the First Pillar. See Joanne van Selm, Immigration 
and Asylum or Foreign Policy: The EU’s Approach to Migrants and their Countries of Origin, in 
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The Janus-like nature of the Member States’ approach to 
migration issues continued into the new millennium. At the Tampere 
European Council in 1999, in a statement that would have been 
inconceivable fifteen years earlier, Member States agreed that the 
Union needed to develop “common policies on asylum and 
immigration,”39 including partnerships with countries of origin, a 
common European asylum system, fair treatment of TCNs, and 
management of migration flows.40 Once again, however, the rhetoric 
did not match Member State action. In negotiations over the Treaty of 
Nice in 2001, Member States decided to modify the Amsterdam 
approach: Any permanent move to QMV on issues of migration and 
asylum would be contingent on a unanimous vote in the Council.41 
The reluctance of the Member States to allow for communitarian 
lawmaking power over regular migration was instantiated in the 
debates over this requirement of unanimity. The challenges presented 
by unanimity are well known—the threat of holdouts “makes the 
probability of cooperation fall with the number of actors who must 
cooperate.”42 And there was a general recognition by 2002 that the 
constraints of unanimity had limited “progress even in realizing the 
short term objectives set in Tampere,” and that there was little chance 
“the ambitious long-term vision agreed to in Tampere could be 
achieved by unanimity voting among [what would soon be twenty-
five] Member States.”43 Within this modified Amsterdam approach, it 
has taken “years of negotiations” to achieve directives on family 
reunification, asylum, and the status of long-term resident TCNs.44 
 
MIGRATION AND THE EXTERNALITIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 143, 151 (Sandra Lavenex 
& Emek M. Uçarer eds., 2002) (“A cross-pillar body made up of member state officials, dealing 
with the foreign policy aspects of asylum and migration would clearly not take on First Pillar 
characteristics.”). 
 39.  Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, (Oct. 15-16, 1999) ¶ 3 
[hereinafter Presidency Conclusions]. 
 40.  See generally Presidency Conclusions, supra note 39.  
 41.  LAHAV, supra note 18, at 47. 
 42.  Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of 
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 140 (2010); see also id. at 139–42 (explaining why 
unanimity rule paralyzes organizations and majority rule can serve to “increase[] the optimal 
number of governments in a federal system”). 
 43.  European Convention Working Group X, Final Report of Working Group X, 
‘Freedom, Security and Justice,’ at 4, CONV 426/02 (Dec. 2, 2002). 
 44.  Simon Green, Divergent Traditions, Converging Responses: Immigration and 
Integration Policy in the UK and Germany, 16 GER. POL. 95, 103 (2007). On family reunification 
rights for TCNs, see generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Rationing Family Values in Europe and 
America: An Immigration Tug of War between States and their Supra-National Associations, 25 
GEO. IMM. L.J. 807 (2011). 
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Only recently has any effort been made at the supranational level to 
regulate legal work-related migration.45 
The ongoing tension between the communitarization of 
immigration and asylum policy and the desire of some Member States 
to maintain national control has resulted in “immigration 
harmonization lag[ging] behind other EU policy areas.”46 But in 
October 2008, under the leadership of the French Presidency of the 
European Union, the Member States agreed to a European Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum (EPIA). In the EPIA, they recognized the 
need for collective action, as “decisions taken by a Member State will 
have repercussions for all other Member States.”47 Of course, such 
collective action could have continued through primarily 
intergovernmental negotiation, but in 2009, the Lisbon Treaty finally 
gave the communitarian institutions a role. 
B. Lisbon and Subsidiarity 
In contrast to migration issues, in which Member States were able 
to maintain their control, in other areas of regulation the European-
level institutions seemed to accrue increasing power even in the 
absence of specific grants from the Member States.48 The Lisbon 
 
 45.  See Council Directive 2009/50, 2009 O.J. (L 155) 17 (EC) (discussing the Commission 
proposals on highly qualified workers (EU Blue Card), which were presented in 2007 and 
approved in 2009). But see Petra Bendel, Everything Under Control? The European Union’s 
Policies and Politics of Immigration, in THE EUROPEANIZATION OF NATIONAL POLICIES AND 
POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION 32, 34 (Thomas Faist & Andreas Ette eds., 2007) (“[I]n legal 
migration . . . some member states have insisted on preserving their domestic competencies and 
have refused to transmit them towards supranational authorities. In particular Germany and its 
Länder have been the most rigid defenders of maintaining domestic discretion with respect to 
labour migration issues . . . .”).  
 46.  Terri Givens & Adam Luedtke, The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: 
Institutions, Salience, and Harmonization, 32 POL’Y STUD. J. 145, 146 (2004); see also Adam 
Luedtke et al., Introduction: Regulating the New Face of Europe, in MIGRANTS AND 
MINORITIES: THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE 1, 6 (Adam Luedtke ed., 2010) (“Another key 
difference between immigration policy and most other areas of EU policy was that until 2004 
the European Commission did not have the sole right of initiative to propose a policy . . . [thus] 
until 2005 harmonisation proceeded in a more bottom-up manner, in line with national 
interests.”). 
 47.  THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY, THE EUROPEAN PACT ON IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM 
(2008), available at http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/content/download/34482/258636/ 
file/19_Plaquette_EN.edf. 
 48.  See Mark Pollack, Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European 
Community, 14 J. PUB. POL’Y 95, 98 (1994); Mark Pollack, The End of Creeping Competence? 
E.U. Policy-Making Since Maastricht, 38 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 519, 527 (2000); see also 
Philippe Schmitter, Imagining the Future of Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts, in 
GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 121, 124 (Gary Marks et al. eds., 1996) (“[T]here is 
no issue area that was the exclusive domain of national policy in 1950 that has not somehow and 
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Treaty was designed in part to address a growing fear among Member 
States of “creeping competence”—a phenomenon in which 
supranational institutions claim power over an increasing number of 
policy areas due to ongoing and possibly self-perpetuating “task 
expansion.”49 To provide more Member State control, Lisbon 
established a general rule of enumerated, or conferred powers, at the 
European level.50 Through a delineation of competences, it sought to 
make clear which powers were conferred on the Union and which 
were retained by the Member States. But not all powers could be 
neatly divided, and some, such as the power over immigration, are 
now shared. 
In detailing the shared power over third-country migration, the 
Lisbon Treaty contains an “eye-catching paradox.”51 Articles 67(2) and 
79(2) provide clear grants of power to the EU to “frame a common 
policy on asylum, immigration and external border control,” including 
“conditions of entry and residence” for immigrants.52 These articles 
demonstrate an embrace of the Community method, complete with 
Commission-driven initiative, co-decision with Parliament, QMV in 
 
to some degree been incorporated within the authoritative purview of the EC/EU.”).  
 49.  See Pollack, supra note 48, at 98. The Lisbon Treaty emerged out of the wreckage of 
the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, a document created after an extensive 
constitutional convention and series of intergovernmental conferences. See Draft Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1 (never ratified). The draft 
constitution failed to be ratified by the Member States, and the Lisbon Treaty was a later effort 
to update the institutions of the European Union in light of the EU’s eastward expansion. The 
need for a draft constitution was in large part justified by the concerns about creeping 
competence and desire for clearly demarcated powers. See Angelika Hable, Reflections on the 
Reform of Competences in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 15 REGIONAL & 
FED. STUD. 145, 145 (2005); see also Ingeborg Tömmel, The European Union—A Federation Sui 
Generis?, in THE EU AND FEDERALISM 41, 48 (Finn Laursen ed., 2011) (“[W]ith more and 
more political tasks moving to the European level—either by deliberate transfer or as a matter 
of fact—governmental actors increasingly perceived the need for a clear distribution of 
competences between the levels.”). 
 50.  See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union arts. 1, 4–5, Feb. 7, 1992, 
2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, 18 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:PDF (“By this Treaty, 
the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Union . . . on which the 
Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common . . . . Competences 
not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.”); accord Armin 
von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast, The Federal Order of Competences, in PRINCIPLES OF 
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 275 (Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2d ed. 
2009).  
 51.  Sara Iglesias Sánchez, European Immigration and the Path Towards Federalism: A 
New Model for the New EU as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?, in EUROPEAN 
MIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES: COHERENCE OR CONTRADICTION? 227, 232 (Cristina 
Gortázar et al. eds., 2012). 
 52.  TFEU, supra note 14, arts. 67(2), 79(2), at 73, 77.  
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the Council, and jurisdiction in the ECJ. Yet according to Article 
79(5), the Member States are to retain power to determine the 
volume of admitted TCNs and, concomitantly, control over their 
national labor markets.53 Given the unwieldy manner in which power 
is divided over migration issues, and the lack of an overarching 
purpose behind the competence,54 determining how to allocate this 
shared competence is difficult. 
The Lisbon Treaty provided a theory and a process for making this 
allocation, through a renewed focus on subsidiarity. Subsidiarity, a 
concept rooted in Catholic theory, is tied to the republican ideal of 
self-government, where actions are taken at the level closest to the 
people affected.55 In addition, the doctrine is often thought “to 
promote higher efficiency and transparency of political decisions and 
respond to demands for accommodation of historically developed 
traditions.”56 But the concept is most often explained in terms similar 
to those describing collective action federalism in the United States: 
Subsidiarity limits supranational action to those issues that cannot be 
resolved appropriately at the Member State level.57 
Subsidiary was first introduced as a general principle of EU law in 
the Maastricht Treaty.58 In both Maastricht and later in the Lisbon 
Treaty, attention to subsidiarity was driven by a desire to protect a 
“clearly defined and legally enforceable area of autonomy” for the 
Member States.59 The Lisbon Treaty rearticulated the key test, which 
states: “[T]he Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of 
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
 
       53.    Id. art. 79(5), at 78. 
 54. See Anna Kocharov, Subsidiarity After Lisbon: Federalism Without a Purpose?, in 
DECONSTRUCTING EU FEDERALISM THROUGH COMPETENCES 7, 12 (Loïc Azoulai et al. eds., 
2011), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2012/10631.pdf (“[T]he divide between 
Union and Member State competences is not set in the Treaties directly (by [an] express limit 
on competences) nor indirectly (by directing the exercise of powers towards any specific 
finalité).”). 
 55.  See George Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339–40 (1994). 
 56.  Christoph Ritzer et al., How to Sharpen a Dull Sword—The Principle of Subsidiarity 
and its Control, 7 GER. L. J. 733, 736 (2006). 
 57.  On collective action federalism, see generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 42.  
 58.  See Maastricht TEU, supra note 33, art. 3(b), at 8 (introducing principle of 
subsidiarity); see also ROBERT SCHÜTZE, FROM DUAL TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 247–49 
(2009) (identifying Maastricht as the treaty in which subsidiarity became a “general 
constitutional principle”).  
 59.  Neville March Hunnings, Rival Constitutional Courts: A Comment on Case 106/77, 15 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 483, 485 (1978). 
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action, be better achieved at the Union level.”60 Although application 
of the principle is designed to assist in determining whether the 
Union or the Member States should exercise competence over a 
particular issue,61 subsidiarity had little bite prior to Lisbon. The ECJ 
was the sole institution with authority to enforce the principle, and it 
chose not to do so.62 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, the ECJ retains jurisdiction over 
questions of subsidiarity,63 but the primary institutional responsibility 
for monitoring subsidiarity has shifted. Recognizing the ECJ’s 
reluctance to intercede with the Union institutions, the Treaty enlists 
the national parliaments of the Member States—the new 
“‘watchdogs’ of subsidiarity”—to police the boundaries of shared 
powers.64 The process is straightforward: All “draft legislative acts” 
must be forwarded by the proposing supranational institution (usually 
the Commission) to the national parliaments,65 along with a statement 
justifying the legislation as appropriate under the subsidiarity 
principle,66 and including support “by qualitative and, wherever 
possible, quantitative indicators.”67 After receiving the draft 
legislation, a national parliament has eight weeks to formulate its 
response.68 If a national parliament, or a chamber therein,69 
determines that the proposed legislation does not comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity, it may submit a reasoned opinion to that 
effect to the Presidents of the European Parliament, Council, and 
Commission.70 
 
 60.  TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 50, art. 5(3), at 9 (emphasis added).  
 61.  Thomas Horsley, Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the 
Subsidiarity Jigsaw?, 50 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 267, 268 (2012). 
 62.  See SCHÜTZE, supra note 58, at 253–56.  
 63.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Protocol on the Application 
of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality art. 7(2), Feb. 7, 1992, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, 
208 [hereinafter TEU Subsidiarity Protocol], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:PDF.  
 64.  Horsley, supra note 61, at 270.  
 65.  TEU Subsidiarity Protocol, supra note 63, arts. 1–2, at 206. Draft legislative acts are 
usually proposals from the Commission, but can include initiatives from a group of Member 
States, or from the Parliament, the ECJ, the European Central Bank, or the European 
Investment Bank. See id. art. 3, at 206.  
 66.  Id. art 5, at 207. 
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id. art. 6, at 207. 
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Protocol on the Role of 
National Parliaments in the European Union art. 3, Feb. 7, 1992, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, 204 
[hereinafter TEU National Parliaments Protocol], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri 
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:PDF. 
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The power of the mechanism is in the numbers: In order for their 
reasoned opinions to have any effect, national parliaments must act in 
concert. If they do so, they activate what is known as the “Early 
Warning System” (EWS). Each national parliament in the European 
Union receives two votes (for bicameral institutions, one vote is 
allocated to each composite body). If reasoned opinions contesting 
the exercise of EU competence on subsidiarity grounds represent 
one-third of all possible votes, then the draft legislation must be 
reviewed by the Union institutions.71 If reasoned opinions represent a 
simple majority of possible votes, the Commission must review its 
proposal, and if it chooses to continue with the proposed legislation, it 
must also forward its justification (along with the opinions from the 
national parliaments) to the Council and the Parliament. At this point, 
a fifty-five percent majority of the Council or a simple majority of the 
Parliament may force the abandonment of the proposal.72 
The combination of these two aspects of the Lisbon Treaty—
shared competence over migration and the related subsidiarity 
review—provides new insight into how the immigration power is 
conceptualized and its use at the supranational level justified.73 
Shortly after the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the Commission 
proposed a directive on work-force migration issues—the 2010 
Seasonal Workers Directive. The proposed Directive’s lukewarm 
reception by the national parliaments sheds light on the contours of 
the underlying federalism debate and on the contested meaning of 
subsidiarity. 
 
 
 
 
 71.  TEU Subsidiarity Protocol, supra note 63, art. 7(2), at 208. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  The Commission has had the right to initiate legislation since 2004 and thus the 
opportunity to present immigration-related policies to the Council for review. Unanimity voting 
in the Council was considered an appropriate substitute for robust subsidiarity review, as 
Member State interests were thought, perhaps incorrectly, to be protected through Council 
representation. Therefore, although the Commission provided some subsidiarity-based 
justifications for its actions, those reasons were not scrutinized through any mechanism of 
review. See Case C-465/07, Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 2009 E.C.R. I-921 
(interpreting the Qualification Directive without subsidiarity analysis). The advent of the EWS 
should present opportunities for more robust reason-giving.  
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C. Justifying Power and the Seasonal Workers Directive 
In 2010, the European Commission prepared a “Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
conditions of entry and residence of TCNs for the purposes of 
seasonal employment.”74 The proposal, as described by the 
Commission, “establishes a fast-track procedure for the admission of 
third-country seasonal workers, based on a common definition and 
common criteria, in particular the existence of a work contract or a 
binding job offer that specified a salary equal to or above a minimum 
level.”75 The proposed Directive concerned “conditions of entry and 
residence, and standards [of issuing] residence permits [by Member 
States,] and the definition of rights of TCNs residing legally in a 
Member State.”76 Limited by enumerated powers, the Commission 
first identified the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) that supported its action—Article 79(2)(a) 
and (b)77—and then, given the shared power over migration, 
conducted a subsidiarity review, providing reasons justifying Union 
action. 
The Commission identified four rationales supporting its proposal. 
First, it argued that the Member States shared a common need for 
seasonal workers, and that due to variation among Member States on 
the national rights granted to TCNs, there could be problematic 
distortions of migratory flows (presumably the danger of 
oversubscription—too many TCNs seeking to enter a particular 
Member State). Second, the Commission drew upon the existence of 
open borders in the Schengen Area to argue for common rules on 
entry to reduce the risk of overstaying and irregular (illegal) 
migration. Third, it provided a rights-based rationale, identifying a 
 
 74.  E.g., Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third-Country Nationals for the Purposes 
of Seasonal Employment, COM (2010) 379 final (July 13, 2010) [hereinafter Commission 
Proposal]. 
 75.  Id. at 5. 
 76.  Id. at 6. 
 77.  TFEU, supra note 14, art. 79(2)(a)–(b), at 77.  
For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures in the 
following areas: (a) the conditions of entry and residence, and standards on the issue 
by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the 
purpose of family reunification; (b) the definition of the rights of third-country 
nationals residing legally in a Member State, including the conditions governing 
freedom of movement and of residence in other Member States[.] 
Id.  
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need to prevent exploitation and sub-standard working conditions for 
TCNs in individual Member States by taking action at the Union 
level. And fourth, it argued that a Union-level approach was 
necessary for effective cooperation with third-countries on migration 
issues, providing a “foreign policy” justification for supranational 
action.78 
The proposed Seasonal Workers Directive generated more 
responses from national parliaments than any other proposal in 2010, 
engendering widespread discussion on both sides. Nine reasoned 
opinions rejected the Commission’s professed competence to propose 
such a directive on grounds of subsidiarity.79 These nine constituted 
more than twenty-five percent of all reasoned opinions raising 
subsidiarity concerns on all proposed legislation filed that year.80 
Other opinions supported the subsidiarity analysis, though some 
nevertheless recommended amendments,81 and two opinions 
concluded that the proposal should fail on different grounds.82 The 
number of reasoned opinions critical of the proposal fell well below 
that needed to engage the EWS mechanisms,83 but the attention 
nevertheless caused the Commission to issue a written response.84 
 
 
 
 
 78.  See Commission Proposal, supra note 74, at 6. 
       79.    The European Commission refers to the report from the House of Commons of the 
United Kingdom as a “reasoned opinion” in its Annex to its Subsidiary Report 2010. Report 
from the Commission on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, at 4, COM (2011) 344 final (June 10, 
2011) (covering the year 2010) [hereinafter Subsidiarity Report 2010]. It is, however, referred to 
as “other communication” by the House of Commons of the United Kingdom on its official 
website. Subsidiarity: Reasoned Opinions, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk 
/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/european-scrutiny-committee/scrutiny- 
reserve-overrides/. 
 80.  Subsidiary Report 2010, supra note 79, at 4. 
 81.  See, e.g., BUNDESRAT DRUCKSACHEN [BR] 442/10 (Ger.), available at http://ec. 
europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/germany/2010_en.htm. 
 82.  Subsidiarity Report 2010, supra note 79, at 7 (citing Latvian Saeima and Lithuanian 
Seimas arguing the proposed Directive should fail on grounds of proportionality).  
 83.  To have triggered automatic review in 2010, eighteen votes (eighteen reasoned 
opinions in opposition to the proposal) would have been necessary.  
 84.  Commission Reply to Opinions Concerning Subsidiarity Received from National 
Parliaments on the Proposal for a Directive on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third-
Country Nationals for the Purposes of Seasonal Employment, COM (2010) 379 (Jan. 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter Commission Reply], available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general 
/relations/relations_other/npo/docs/united_kingdom/2010/com20100379/com20100379_commons
_reply_en.pdf. The Commission submitted one comprehensive answer in response to all the 
various reasoned opinions. 
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In general terms, the national parliaments opposing the proposed 
Directive highlighted the shared power of the Member States in 
migration issues, noting in particular Article 79(5), which reserves to 
each Member State the power to determine the number of TCNs to 
admit to its jurisdiction.85 The functional effects of this power, 
unacknowledged in the Commission’s initial subsidiarity analysis,86 
drove many of the arguments against Union-level regulation. Specific 
objections focused in large part on the Commission’s first three 
justifications: smoothing migratory flows, reducing the risk of 
irregular migration, and protecting the rights of TCNs. 
In its critique of the Commission’s first justification—smoothing 
migratory flows—the House of Commons of the United Kingdom 
questioned the Commission’s analysis of the nature of the 
competition distorting the migratory flow. It found “competition 
between Member States to improve the conditions of employment for 
temporary seasonal workers [to be] a sign of a healthy labour market, 
not one that requires further regulatory intervention.”87 The Senate of 
the Czech Republic argued that adequate regulation was possible on 
the national level, and several opinions queried how the proposed 
Directive would change the current competitive dynamic, given the 
Member States’ individual control over numbers admitted.88 As the 
House of Lords of the United Kingdom noted: 
We can see that if one Member State grants seasonal workers 
better minimum working conditions, this may make migration to 
that State more attractive. This however would also happen under 
the Directive, since (a) the rights granted under it . . . are simply 
the minimal rights granted . . . and (b) the Member States remain 
in control of admissions to their territory.89 
 
 
 85.  TFEU, supra note 14, art. 79(5), at 78. 
 86.  Commission Proposal, supra note 74. 
 87.  EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, THE COMMITTEE’S CONCLUSION ON THE 
SEASONAL WORKERS’ DIRECTIVE, 2010, H.C. 12208, at 2 (U.K.) [hereinafter U.K. HOUSE OF 
COMMONS CONCLUSIONS], available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
committees/european-scrutiny/13October2010.pdf. 
 88.  Zákon č. 562/2010 Sb. (Czech), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/ 
relations/relations_other/npo/docs/czech_republic/2010/com20100379/com20100379_senate_opi
nion_en.pdf.  
 89.  EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, SUBSIDIARITY ASSESSMENT: ADMISSION OF THIRD-
COUNTRY NATIONALS AS SEASONAL WORKERS, 2010-2011, H.L. 35, at 4 (U.K.) [hereinafter 
U.K. HOUSE OF LORDS SUBSIDIARITY ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.statewatch.org/ 
news/2010/oct/eu-uk-hol-cttee-seasonal-workers.pdf. 
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 The Commission’s second justification—reducing the risk of 
irregular migration—was met with similar derision by the national 
parliaments. They acknowledged that any TCN who crossed an 
internal border from one Member State into another could fall into 
illegal status by remaining in that second Member State.90 But 
national parliaments saw little evidence as to how harmonizing the 
conditions of entry between Member States would discourage 
irregular migration.91 Rather, national parliaments argued that the 
absolute number of TCNs admitted to each Member State was the 
more pertinent issue. If a Member State failed to calibrate the needs 
of its labor market and admitted too many workers, the error might 
result in irregular migration (TCNs seeking to move without 
permission to other Member States). But as Member States retained 
the ability to set those admission numbers under Article 79(5), the 
issue of irregular migration could not be resolved by harmonized 
regulations on entry.92 
Protecting the rights of TCNs—the Commission’s third 
rationale—has important normative and rhetorical power in the 
European Union. Calls for rights uniformity have encouraged a 
centralizing tendency, even in the face of the renewed focus on 
enumeration and categorization of Union powers. As Loïc Azoulai 
has written, “[t]he centrality of the language of rights has superseded 
the language of the division of powers in the realm of EU law. EU 
rights . . . are functionally broad in their scope and not sector-
specific.”93 The principle of subsidiarity does not deny the relevance of 
rights or their uniform application, but the analysis does require a 
determination that rights protection is better done at the central level. 
Building on this prong of the analysis, the British Parliament and the 
Austrian Bundesrat seriously questioned the Commission’s 
conclusion that EU action was needed. The House of Commons of the 
 
 90.  Reasoned Opinion from the Senate of the Republic of Poland on the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Conditions of Entry and 
Residence of Third-Country Nationals for the Purposes of Seasonal Employment, PARL. EUR. 
DOC. CM 835429 (2010), available at http://www.europarl.eruopa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/ 
documents/juri/cm/835/835429/835429en.pdf (“In a situation where EU regulations do not 
envisage the free movement of employees from third countries between Member States, and 
permits are issued by national authorities and have no more than national scope, there is no 
need to harmonise the regulations affecting the issue of permits for seasonal employment.”).  
 91.  See, e.g., U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS CONCLUSIONS, supra note 87, at 3.  
 92.  See TFEU, supra note 14, art. 79(5), at 78. 
 93.  Loïc Azoulai, Introduction to DECONSTRUCTING EU FEDERALISM THROUGH 
COMPETENCES 1, 2 (Loïc Azoulai et al. eds., 2011), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/ 
intalcdi/PE/2012/10631.pdf. 
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United Kingdom, citing the Commission’s impact assessment, argued 
that poor working conditions derive from national “deficiencies” such 
as “lax enforcement,” an issue that would be difficult to solve by EU 
action and that went unaddressed by the proposed Directive.94 
In its written response, the European Commission, without 
contributing much new information or argumentation, reiterated its 
concern about migratory flows and the possibility that they would be 
distorted due to varying rules in the Member States. But it strongly 
denied the argument that the Article 79(5) power was of greater 
importance than conditions of entry. The fact that Member States set 
the numbers of admitted TCNs “in no way annul[led] the validity of 
the argument about distortion of migratory flows. Indeed, quotas have 
to be viewed as only one element impacting migratory flows. Another, 
equally important aspect is the attractiveness of the national 
schemes.”95 
The one rationale that the national parliaments did not 
meaningfully consider was the Commission’s final justification for 
Union action: more effective cooperation with third countries. The 
argument was described as “unpersuasive,”96 “inadequate,”97 
unacceptable,98 and offering “no added value.”99 But the Commission’s 
rationale was both serious and embedded in a political context well-
known to the Member States. The connection between immigration 
policy and foreign policy had been made explicit in a series of earlier 
efforts by the Commission to advocate for a “Comprehensive” or 
“Global Approach” to immigration.100 This approach seeks to 
 
 94.  U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS CONCLUSIONS, supra note 87, at 3; see also U.K. HOUSE OF 
LORDS SUBSIDIARITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 89, at 5 (“Measures of national law are of 
course binding and enforceable, and are at least as effective as EU measures in overcoming 
exploitation.”); see also Bundesrat [BR] [Federal Council], ¶ 5 (Austria) [hereinafter Austrian 
Bundesrat Opinion], available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_ 
other/npo/docs/austria/2010/com20100379/com20100379_bundesrat_opinion_en.pdf (“Although 
protection against social dumping is an important aim that should be given increased attention 
in all European Union measures, in this specific case there is once again no transborder 
problem.”). 
 95.  Commission Reply, supra note 84, at 2. 
 96.  U.K. HOUSE OF LORDS SUBSIDIARITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 89, at 5. 
 97.  Austrian Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 94, ¶ 8. 
 98.  See U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS CONCLUSIONS, supra note 87, at 3. 
 99.  Statement from the Eerste Kamer and the Tweede Kamer [Senate and House of 
Representatives], Subsidiarity Test of the Proposal for a Directive Concerning the Conditions for 
Access to and Residence in the EU of Subjects of Third Countries, with a View to Seasonal 
Employment, Oct. 14, 2010 (Neth.), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/ 
relations/relations_other/npo/netherlands/2010_en.htm. 
 100.  See Carole Vogel, The Migration-Development Nexus: Is the Migration Policy of the 
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determine immigration policy in light of its “foreign policy 
implications and the implications which foreign policy has for it.”101 In 
making this connection in the context of the Seasonal Workers 
Directive, the Commission found “an undeniable link between 
migration and development. A common European Union legal 
regime on third-country seasonal workers has been long awaited by 
some third-countries and it is viewed as an important element of the 
European Union migration policy with a potential significant impact 
on the development policy.”102 
Although more national parliaments challenged the Seasonal 
Workers Directive than they did any other Commission proposal in 
2010 or 2011, the EWS was not activated.103 The proposed Directive 
therefore progressed to the next stage of the legislative process and is 
still being reviewed by the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers. Without action from the national parliaments, the only 
remaining institution able to slow or stop the Directive on subsidiarity 
grounds is the ECJ. 
As previously discussed, the ECJ has not approached the 
subsidiarity analysis with any rigor, but it nevertheless provides the 
background legal norms against which to make an assessment of the 
Commission’s reasoning. In two recent opinions, the ECJ confirmed 
that in examining compliance with the subsidiarity principle, it would 
look to the Commission’s report to determine the rationales provided 
for supranational action.104 The ECJ will not rank the Commission’s 
justifications nor does it require a justification directed to each 
legislative choice.105 Thus, in the shadow of ECJ review, the 
 
European Union Coherent with its Development Policy?, in EUROPEAN MIGRATION AND 
ASYLUM POLICIES: COHERENCE OR CONTRADICTION? 273, 277 (Cristina Gortázar et al. eds., 
2012) (“The commission has always seen itself as the ‘motor’ behind the Global Approach.”); 
Sandra Lavenex, Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control, 29 
W. EUR. POL. 329, 333 (2006) (using the term “Comprehensive Approach”).  
 101.  van Selm, supra note 38, at 143–44. 
 102.  See Commission Reply, supra note 84, at 3. 
     103.   See generally Report from the Commission on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, at 7, 
COM (2012) 373 final (July 10, 2012) [hereinafter Subsidiarity Report 2011], available 
 at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/documents/com_2012_0373_en.pdf; 
Subsidiarity Report 2010, supra note 79. 
 104.  Subsidiarity Report 2011, supra note 103. See generally Case C-176/09, Grand Duchy of 
Lux. v. Parliament and Council, 2009 E.C.R. I-3727; Case C-58/08, The Queen v. Sec’y of State 
for Bus., Enter. & Regulatory Reform, 2008 E.C.R. I-4999. 
 105.  TFEU, supra note 14, art. 296, at 175–76 requires that “[l]egal acts shall state the 
reasons on which they are based.” Yet, the Commission need not even make express reference 
to the principle of subsidiarity to satisfy that requirement; instead, according to the ECJ, it is 
enough for the Commission to give reasons that simply imply conformity with the principle of 
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Commission needs only one generally applicable rationale to justify 
its power.  
In the context of the Seasonal Workers Directive, the 
Commission’s first three grounds, while plausible, are hardly 
incontrovertible arguments for supranational action. The Member 
States have a strong retort: The number of admitted TCNs is the 
driving factor behind both migratory flow and the possibility of 
negative externalities between or among Member States, and without 
addressing that issue—which the Union cannot do under the Treaty—
Union-wide action on conditions of entry would be of little value. But 
even accepting these Member-State counterarguments, only one 
persuasive rationale is necessary to make the case for supranational 
power. And the Commission’s final rationale, the foreign policy 
justification, went mostly uncontested by the national parliaments. 
Whether the foreign policy rationale will continue to be used by 
the Commission is uncertain but not unlikely—at least one European 
scholar contends that it is “the strongest argument” in favor of Union 
action over immigration, as the need to ensure a unified voice in 
foreign policy matters can give support to supranational action “even 
in situations purely internal to one Member State.”106 As the reasoned 
opinions on the Seasonal Workers Directive demonstrate, there is a 
decided lack of attention by the national parliaments to this line of 
reasoning. But the expansive potential of the reasoning is clear from 
the commentary and, as will be shown, from the experiences of the 
United States—an argument that can reach even the “purely internal” 
affairs of a Member State is powerful indeed. 
II. THE FEDERAL PLENARY POWER OVER IMMIGRATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
As in today’s European Union, the locus of immigration power 
was not clearly defined in the early United States. Notwithstanding 
modern acceptance of immigration as a federal power, American 
history demonstrates that, prior to 1875, both the states and the 
federal government enacted laws that regulated the entry and 
conditions of entry for immigrants. The result was a “complex hybrid 
of state and federal policy,”107 which shares important parallels with 
 
subsidiarity. See Case C-233/94, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 1997 E.C.R. I-2405, ¶ 28. 
Cf. Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Parliament and Council, 2001 E.C.R. 1-07079, ¶ 33. 
 106.  Kocharov, supra note 54, at 20. 
 107.  Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 
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the EU dynamic outlined in Part I.108 When the U.S. federal 
government finally took a more active approach to regulating 
immigration, it too needed to provide a persuasive rationale to justify 
federal action. The Supreme Court drew on a number of different 
justifications for the recognition of federal immigration power, 
including arguments based on the Constitution. Some of this 
reasoning is naturally quite distinct from that provided by the 
European Commission, but one of the Court’s key justifications, and 
the one on which it relied heavily in the early years of federal 
regulation, was the link between immigration and “foreign affairs.” 
This persuasive justification took on great doctrinal significance in the 
decades after its articulation, structuring what are now entrenched 
federal-state relations in the immigration area. 
This Part begins by providing an overview of immigration policy 
in the early (pre-1875) United States to demonstrate the historical 
praxis of immigration regulation and the questions surrounding the 
scope of federal power. It then outlines and assesses the rationales 
adopted by the Supreme Court to justify federal action, with a 
particular focus on the foreign affairs justification. The Part concludes 
by discussing how American federalism has been affected by the 
Court’s reliance on the nexus between immigration and foreign 
affairs. 
A. A Hybrid Beginning 
As is the Treaty of Lisbon, the U.S. Constitution is a document of 
delegated, or enumerated, powers. The Constitution does not provide 
a specific grant of power to regulate immigration. It does, however, 
state: “The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o establish a uniform rule 
of naturalization”109 and “[t]o make all laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing power[].”110 The 
delegation of the naturalization power to Congress stemmed from the 
perceived inadequacies of the system of government under the 
Articles of Confederation. The Articles guaranteed open borders and 
free movement between states, and entitled free inhabitants of any 
one state “to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several 
 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1896 (1993). See generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996). 
 108.  See supra Part I. 
 109.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. 
 110.  Id. at cl. 18. 
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states.”111 This dynamic created tension, as the state with the most 
lenient standard of residency would set citizenship qualifications for 
the entire confederation.112 Allocating naturalization power to the 
federal level eliminated an individual state’s ability to serve as 
national gatekeeper,113 as the federal government would be able to 
impose a uniform rule of naturalization on all states.114 
Notwithstanding this federal allocation, states continued to 
promulgate their own naturalization laws well into the 1790s—an 
indication of the slow acceptance of national power.115 
Aside from naturalization, the Constitution provided only 
“nonexistent or vague” references to citizenship and immigration,116 
and Congress’s power to regulate immigration was at issue in debates 
over bills throughout the 1790s and early 1800s. The Alien Act of 1798 
gave the President power to “order to depart” those aliens he 
determined to be “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United 
States.”117 Opponents argued “that Congress had been delegated no 
power to control the admission of aliens,”118 and that “the power of 
admitting foreigners . . . remained with the states.”119 In other contexts, 
 
 111.  See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 art. 4.  
[T]he free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from 
Justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in 
the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to 
and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and 
commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants 
thereof respectively . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 112.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 237 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 113.  See E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 
1798-1965 11 (1981) (noting debate in the House of Representatives promoting a national rule 
of naturalization, and in particular a comment by Senator Robert Sherman of Connecticut, in 
which he advocated for such a rule “‘in order to prevent particular states receiving citizens, and 
forcing them upon others who would not have received them’” (citation omitted)).  
 114.  Congress passed the first national naturalization legislation in 1790, requiring three 
years of residency before an individual was eligible to naturalize. It changed the requirement to 
five years in 1795, and then to fourteen years in 1798 (as part of the legislation surrounding the 
infamous Alien and Sedition Acts), but returned to five years in 1802. See id. at 11–17.  
 115.  See JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870 
219 (1978). 
 116.  MICHAEL C. LEMAY, FROM OPEN DOOR TO DUTCH DOOR 20 (1987). 
 117.  An Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired 1800). 
 118.  Neuman, supra note 107, at 1881. 
 119.  Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of Forgiveness, 45 
CONN. L. REV. 743, 762 & n.97 (2013) [hereinafter Lindsay, Constitution of Forgiveness] 
(quoting 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 1986 (1799) (statement of Rep. Otis)); see id. at 762 (discussing 
the contemporary presumption that “the individual states had ‘reserved to themselves the 
power of regulating what relates to emigrants’” (citation omitted)). See also Sarah H. Cleveland, 
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth-Century Origins 
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debate focused on whether the commerce clause, giving Congress 
power to regulate commerce among the several states, might allow 
Congress to pass immigration-related laws.120 But commerce was a 
more circumscribed concept then. For example, constitutional 
justification for a federal quarantine law failed, as quarantines were 
considered to fall under the state police powers and were thus outside 
congressional reach.121 
Congress passed the first bill regulating immigration, or more 
accurately, the conditions of immigration, in 1819.122 The Passenger 
Act limited the number of passengers that could be transported on 
ships, required that ships leaving the United States bound for Europe 
provide passengers certain amounts of food and water, and created a 
reporting system for passenger data.123 These new minimum standards 
for steerage class resulted in increased ticket prices for the cheapest 
accommodations, which had a disparate impact on immigrants.124 But 
there is no evidence in the congressional debates that Congress’s 
purpose was to restrict immigration;125 rather the legislative history 
demonstrates Congress was concerned about the high mortality rates 
on Atlantic crossings.126 
During this time period and until the Civil War, states legislated 
on various aspects of immigration policy; beyond public health 
regulation (such as the quarantine provisions mentioned above), 
states regulated “the movement of the poor”127 and sought both to 
encourage and to manage immigration flows. The poor had few 
friends in nineteenth-century America: Many states passed anti-
pauper laws,128 and, like TCNs in today’s European Union, the 
 
of Plenary Power over Foreign Relations, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 88–98 (2002) (discussing debates 
over the Alien Act). 
 120.  Neuman, supra note 107, at 1864. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  HUTCHINSON, supra note 113, at 22. 
 123.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 124.  Id. at 22 n.40. 
 125.  Martin Schain suggests the law was designed to “discourage the immigration of 
paupers.” SCHAIN, supra note 2, at 190. Yet, Hutchinson found no evidence of that purpose in 
the debates. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 113, at 22. In fact, in 1855, an attempt to prevent the 
immigration of criminals and the poor “triggered states’ rights objections in the Senate and 
rejection by the House of Representatives.” Neuman, supra note 107, at 1859. 
 126.  See Neuman, supra note 107, at 21 (“In urging the need for such legislation, it was 
reported that during the preceding year 1,000 out of 5,000 persons who had sailed from 
Antwerp died on the voyage.”). 
 127.  Id. at 1841 (mentioning, in addition, “regulation of the movement of criminals, 
regulation of slavery, and other policies of racial subordination”). 
 128.  SCHAIN, supra note 2, at 190. 
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nineteenth-century poor could not move freely.129 This limitation 
made poor laws a useful tool against unwanted immigrants: 
“Unnaturalized immigrants remained permanently subject to 
deportation under the provisions of the poor laws empowering local 
officials to seek an order causing paupers without settlement to be 
sent back where they ‘belonged’ at public expense.”130 Not all state 
efforts were restrictive or discriminatory, however. In 1845, Michigan 
and other states encouraged immigration by opening offices of 
foreign emigration;131 the State of New York’s Commissioners of 
Emigration were responsible not only for “passenger reporting and 
bonding, [but also for] the protection of immigrants from fraud and 
abuse.”132 The states were also responsible for processing the 
thousands of incoming people. In 1855, New York opened the Castle 
Garden Emigrant Landing Depot,133 which received eight million 
immigrants by 1892, when the federal government opened Ellis 
Island.134 
The immigration system prior to 1875 “evolved informally from 
concurrent policies” enacted at both levels of government, and there 
is some indication that this historical fact reflects the contemporary 
understanding of the constitutional powers. As Gerald Neuman has 
argued, “a truly exclusive federal power over interstate and 
international migration would have been highly threatening under 
antebellum conditions.”135 The threat of free movement of persons, in 
particular that of freed slaves or free blacks, gave strong impetus to 
 
 129.  See Neuman, supra note 107, at 1846–47, 1867 n.72 (“The right of the poor to travel 
was not vindicated until Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).”); cf. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 
41 U.S. 539, 625 (1842) (holding that states retained their police power to restrict the movement 
of a specific class of people—slaves). 
 130.  Neuman, supra note 107, at 1852. 
 131.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF MICHIGAN 14–15, available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/ 
documents/publications/manual/2001-2002/2001-mm-0003-0026-History.pdf; see also LEMAY, 
supra note 116, at 34 (“By the 1870s, twenty-five of the then thirty-eight states took some sort of 
official action designed to promote immigration. South Carolina went so far as to grant a five-
year tax exemption on all real estate bought by immigrants.”). 
 132.  Neuman, supra note 107, at 1855. 
 133.  LEMAY, supra note 116, at 17. 
 134.  Maryellen Fullerton, A Tale of Two Decades: War Refugees and Asylum Policy in the 
European Union, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 87, 91 n.8 (2011) (citing Castle Clinton 
National Monument, History & Culture, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/cacl/ 
historyculture/index.htm (last visited May 6, 2013)). 
 135.  Neuman, supra note 107, at 1889; see also Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of 
the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 612 (2008) (“A strong statement 
regarding the federal government's control over the migration of people among the states would 
have suggested federal authority to regulate (and perhaps prohibit) the domestic slave trade.”). 
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the slave states to maintain control over the rights of entry into their 
communities.136 Some have linked this slave power, and its 
constitutional protections, to the existence of concurrent state and 
federal competence over immigration.137 Of course, this historical 
argument is not dispositive: Congress may have decided not to act in 
the area, even with a credible claim to exclusive authority, due to “the 
strong and rising state rights sentiment” in the antebellum years.138 
Nevertheless, and for whatever reason, the shared efforts in the 
sphere of immigration were an ongoing aspect of early American 
history and led to critical tensions between the federal and state 
governments in the late nineteenth-century. 
B. Federal Exclusivity and Foreign Affairs 
In Europe, the Commission proposed supranational legislation to 
address a question of immigration, and its action required persuasive 
justification under the Lisbon Treaty. In contrast, in the United States, 
direct tension between federal and state governments brought the 
issue of power over immigration to the forefront. By the mid-1870s, 
certain receiving-states, such as New York and California, sought to 
profit from migration, while still limiting that migration for both 
economic and racist reasons. Their policies stood in tension with the 
national need for immigrants to power the western expansion and rise 
of industry. This societal conflict would eventually find its way to the 
Supreme Court.139 The initial skirmishes were over state laws and 
actions that threatened the national project; only later were federal 
laws, and the power to enact them, at issue. The Supreme Court 
identified a positive federal power over immigration that would serve 
both to preempt state action as a constitutional matter (preventing 
state action even in the absence of federal law) and to justify federal 
regulatory action itself. 
 
 136.  Neuman, supra note 107, at 1866–67. 
 137.  See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511–22 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(finding “an acknowledgment of [federal immigration] power (as well as of the States' similar 
power, subject to federal abridgment) . . . in Art. I, § 9, which provided that ‘[t]he Migration or 
Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall 
not be prohibited’” by Congress prior to 1808); see also Rodríguez, supra note 135, at 612 
(linking the existence of the slave trade to notions of concurrent power).  
 138.  HUTCHINSON, supra note 113, at 45. 
 139.  Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 353 
(2008) (“Power struggles between the national government and immigrant-receiving states like 
New York and California are part of what gave rise to the plenary power doctrine in the 
nineteenth century.”). 
DELANEY 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2013  7:27 PM 
2013] JUSTIFYING POWER 181 
Between 1875 and 1895, the Supreme Court articulated a number 
of theories under which it concluded that the federal government had 
exclusive power to regulate immigration. Purely textual arguments 
were limited; there was a marked failure to engage with or rely on the 
Naturalization Clause.140 Instead, the three main theories discussed 
were tied explicitly to foreign affairs: First, regulating immigration, or 
immigrants more specifically, could be understood as part of 
Congress’s power to regulate foreign commerce; second, a type of 
collective action federalism argument rooted in the nature of foreign 
affairs could require national action over immigration; and third, 
immigration power could be seen as an incident of national 
sovereignty. The final two justifications were carried forward into 
twentieth-century jurisprudence. Critical to both of these foreign 
affairs arguments is the fact that all immigrants, by virtue of being 
immigrants, must be citizens, nationals, or subjects of a foreign 
country, thus creating an indelible link between immigration and 
foreign relations.141 
Early cases seemed to locate the federal immigration power in the 
federal government’s power to regulate foreign commerce,142 but they 
left unspecified the exact connection between commerce and the 
internal labor market. In 1875, the Supreme Court heard a series of 
cases challenging state statutes that compelled “owners of vessels to 
pay a sum of money for every passenger brought by them from a 
foreign shore.”143 In Henderson v. Mayor of New York,144 Justice Miller 
concluded that New York’s bond system was the functional equivalent 
of a tax and thus unconstitutional.145 He described the “transportation 
of passengers from European ports to those of the United States” as 
“a part of our commerce with foreign nations,” due to the immigrants’ 
 
 140.  Modern cases, however, frequently cite the Naturalization Clause as contributing to 
the federal power over immigration. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498 (finding federal 
authority to rest “in part” on the Naturalization Clause).  
 141.  As noted, supra note 16, a small number of people are stateless. 
 142.  These cases reflected antebellum attitudes that “federal authority over immigration, 
whatever its extent, derived from Congress’s constitutionally enumerated commerce power.” 
Lindsay, Constitution of Forgiveness, supra note 119, at 778 (citing City of New York v. Miln, 36 
U.S. 102 (1837), and The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849)). 
 143.  Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 268 (1875). 
 144.  92 U.S. 259 (1875). The case was joined with Commissioners of Immigration v. North 
German Lloyd (the second case concerned an identical statute in Louisiana). 
 145.  Id. at 274–75. A direct tax would have been unlawful as an impermissible regulation of 
commerce, under The Passenger Cases, decided in 1849. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 
(1849). 
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connection to the labor market.146  
In Chy Lung v. Freeman,147 Miller considered a California statute 
that required payments from ship owners for certain passengers but 
went beyond New York’s terms by giving unlimited discretion to a 
state official to determine who should be required to pay. Having 
been selected as one who needed a bond paid on her behalf, a 
Chinese woman was not permitted to land as the ship owner refused 
to pay; she was detained on the ship and filed a writ of habeas corpus 
challenging the statute. Miller concluded that the power to pass “laws 
which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign 
nations” belongs to Congress, by virtue of its power to regulate 
foreign commerce, and not to the states.148 The woman in this case, 
however, was not evidently in the class of laborers described in 
Henderson, and Miller provided no further explanation of the specific 
connection to foreign commerce. As late as 1884, in Edye v. 
Robertson,149 Miller described immigration as the “business of 
bringing foreigners to this country,”150 thus incorporating it as a 
“branch of commerce.”151 Given the efforts of the Court in the 1920s 
and 1930s to insulate labor as an area of traditional state concern in 
the domestic commerce clause project,152 these types of foreign 
commerce clause arguments (standing on their own and unconnected 
to a more general foreign affairs power) were not favored in later 
cases.153 
 
 146.  Henderson, 92 U.S. at 270–71.  
[Immigrants] bring still more largely the labor which we need to till our soil, build our 
railroads, and develop the latent resources of the country in its minerals, its 
manufactures, and its agriculture. Is the regulation of this great system a regulation of 
commerce? Can it be doubted that a law which prescribes the terms on which vessels 
shall engage in it is a law regulating this branch of commerce? 
Id. Justice Miller believed the federal power over commerce was exclusive and did not agree 
that states had concurrent power to regulate where Congress had not done so. But, he added, 
even under a theory of concurrent powers, the New York regulation must fail as the system 
which it attempted to regulate was “international,” belonging “to that class of laws which 
concern the exterior relation of this whole nation with other nations and governments.” Id. at 
273.  
 147.  92 U.S. 275 (1875). 
 148.  Id. at 280. 
 149.  (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580 (1884). 
 150.  Id. at 595. 
 151.  Lindsay, Constitution of Forgiveness, supra note 119, at 792. 
 152.  See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1936) (holding that the state 
retains the power to regulate hours and wages in the coal industry); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 
U.S. 251, 275–76 (1918) (holding that it is incumbent on the states to regulate the employment 
of children).  
 153.  Matthew Lindsay suggests that in 1889, the Supreme Court “precipitous[ly] 
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Justice Miller also introduced a second theory in Chy Lung—a 
justification for federal power over immigration reflecting a 
subsidiarity or collective action-type federalism analysis.154 By virtue 
of its regulation of aliens, as citizens or subjects of a foreign country, 
California’s action was seen as necessarily tied to foreign affairs. 
Using the logic of federalism and this connection between 
immigration and foreign affairs, Miller argued that the power over 
entry should rest with the federal government. Focusing on the 
implications of unilateral action by a state in a federal system, he 
highlighted the likelihood of externalities caused by this regulation 
negatively affecting the other states. He presented a hypothetical: 
What if California had prevented the entry of British, rather than 
Chinese, subjects? Such a powerful country might make a claim for 
redress, and in so doing, would make it upon the United States as a 
whole, not merely on California. If war ensued, “would California 
alone suffer, or all the Union?”155 Miller determined that the 
Constitution, which clearly recognizes the dangers of unilateral state 
action by giving certain powers to the federal government, would not 
do “so foolish a thing as to leave it in the power of the States to pass 
laws whose enforcement renders the general government liable to just 
reclamations which it must answer.”156 His argument gains additional 
force from the knowledge that, in 1789, foreign affairs powers 
themselves were granted to the federal government precisely because 
of the interstate conflicts they threatened.157 Because the type of 
 
abandon[ed]” the otherwise “long-standing Commerce Clause framework.” Matthew J. 
Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal 
Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010) [hereinafter Lindsay, Immigration 
as Invasion]. See also Cleveland, supra note 119, at 133–34 (discussing abandonment of foreign 
commerce clause approach). Lindsay is certainly correct that the Court no longer uses the 
foreign commerce clause as a stand-alone justification for power over immigration; it is 
nevertheless often included in the list of reasons undergirding federal authority over 
immigration. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (“Federal authority to regulate the 
status of aliens derives from various sources, including the Federal Government's power ‘[t]o 
establish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization,’ its power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations,’ and its broad authority over foreign affairs.” (citations omitted)). 
 154.  Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279–80 (1875). 
 155.  Id. at 279. 
 156.  Id. at 280.  
 157.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 21 (John Jay) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (arguing in 
favor of a national government because “[u]nder the National Government, treaties and articles 
of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in 
the same manner; whereas adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen States . . . 
will not always accord or be consistent”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 5, at 30 (John Jay) (E.H. Scott 
ed., 1898) (arguing against multiple states or confederacies because they “would neither love 
nor trust one another; but, on the contrary, would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual 
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tensions that immigration regulation would cause were thought to be 
foreign relations tensions, the two areas meshed perfectly together. 
The theory behind this foreign affairs justification for federal 
immigration power is thus the closest to that presented by the 
Commission in its view of “foreign policy.” 
In part because of the Court’s determination that the states could 
not take action in this manner,158 Congress passed its first Immigration 
Act in 1875, which prevented criminals from entering the country and 
which prohibited the importation of Chinese women for immoral 
purposes.159 A series of immigration and naturalization acts followed 
in 1882, 1891, and 1906.160 Also in the 1880s, Congress passed a series 
of acts that directly focused on immigration from China. The Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882, amended and extended by acts in 1884 and 
1888, prevented Chinese laborers from entering the United States and 
required those present to obtain a certificate for reentry before 
leaving the country.161 Eventually, the amendments of 1888 prohibited 
reentry completely.162 In Chae Chan Ping v. United States,163 the Court 
considered whether Congress had the power to pass the 1888 Act. 
After concluding that the terms of various treaties with China did not 
limit congressional action in the area, the Court sought to identify the 
positive authority of the federal government to pass the legislation. 
Like the Court in Chy Lung, the Court in Chae Chan Ping 
grounded Congress’s immigration power in the federal government’s 
power over foreign affairs. Unlike Justice Miller, who seemed to 
justify federal power by reasoning that the admission of immigrants is 
a matter better addressed at the federal level, Justice Field introduced 
the third type of foreign affairs justification: Because the United 
States is a sovereign nation, it must have the powers incidental to 
sovereignty, including “the power of exclusion of foreigners.”164 This 
 
injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in which some nations 
doubtless wish to see us, in which we should be, formidable only to each other”). 
 158.  HUTCHINSON, supra note 113, at 66 (“Almost by default the regulation of immigration 
was falling to the federal government, and the representatives of the states that had formerly 
opposed federal intervention were now asking for it.”). 
 159.  Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477. 
 160.  E.g., Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 596; Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 
1084. 
 161.  Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943). 
 162.  See Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504. For a discussion of the various Chinese 
Exclusion Acts and their evolution, see generally MARTIN B. GOLD, FORBIDDEN CITIZENS: 
CHINESE EXCLUSION AND THE U.S. CONGRESS (2012). 
 163.  (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 164.  Id. at 609. 
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“incident of sovereignty” should be considered part of the sovereign 
powers delegated to the United States by the Constitution, including 
the powers “to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel 
invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments 
to the states, and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship.”165 
Justice Field linked the power to exclude most closely with the power 
to conduct war: “It matters not in what form such aggression and 
encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its 
national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon 
us.”166 And no actual war was required to give Congress this power: If 
foreign persons are “dangerous to . . . peace and security, their 
exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual 
hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects.”167 Thus 
Justice Field, by tying immigration to foreign affairs and then to 
sovereignty, created a powerful argument for federal plenary power 
over immigration.168 A sovereign must have the power to exclude and, 
as would be made clear in subsequent cases, expel unwanted 
persons.169 
C. The Plenary Power and Federalism in the United States 
The Court’s link between foreign affairs and immigration has had 
a sweeping effect. The Court has determined that the federal 
government has a plenary power over foreign affairs, or in other 
words, a “comprehensive power to conduct foreign relations without 
interference or limitation by the states.”170 By incorporating 
immigration into this context—whether for reasons of inherent 
sovereignty or collective action federalism—the federal government 
now has “plenary power” over immigration. This “sovereign 
nonenumerated Congressional power” has created a number of 
problematic knock-on effects.171 The effects on the federal dynamic in 
 
 165.  Id. at 604. 
 166.  Id. at 606. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  This inherent sovereignty argument was further elaborated by Justice Gray in 
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (finding as “an accepted maxim of 
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and 
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to 
admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe”). 
 169.  See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1892). 
 170.  Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 
1617, 1620 (1997). 
 171.  Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional 
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 274 (1984). 
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the United States are the most relevant for the comparison with 
Europe and will be addressed first and in more depth. As a matter of 
constitutional and political tension in immigration matters, federalism 
is only now reemerging as an issue. The implications of the federal 
plenary power over immigration for judicial review and separation of 
powers are considered more important in the American context but, 
for purposes of this comparative project, will be touched on only 
briefly. 
Notwithstanding its articulation of a broad federal power over 
immigration, the Court has attempted to retain some areas of state 
regulation by distinguishing between those regulations, exclusive to 
federal power, that affect the conditions of entry and selection of 
immigrants, and others, regulating aliens more generally, that states 
may pass.172 But this dividing line has been hard to maintain. As soon 
as it was formulated, it came under pressure.173 In the 1915 case Traux 
v. Raich,174 the Court found unconstitutional an Arizona state law 
regulating the employment of aliens.175 It concluded that “[t]he 
assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning 
a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the state would be tantamount 
to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode, for in 
ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work.”176 But what 
about “housing, education, or health care—the denial of which 
threatens an immigrant’s ability to survive as a new resident”?177 
Where do the conditions of entry end? As Adam Cox has persuasively 
 
 172.  Cox, supra note 139, at 346 (“[T]he plenary power doctrine is important because it is 
widely understood to draw a sharp constitutional distinction between rules that select 
immigrants and rules that otherwise regulate them.”). 
 173.  This is not surprising. As Ernie Young has written, “exclusive spheres of authority 
simply cannot be defined and maintained in a principled way.” Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling 
Persistence of Dual Federalism, NOMOS LIV: LIBERTY (forthcoming) (manuscript at 42), 
available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2689. Young discusses the 
pressures of dual federalism, and notes:  
Dual federalism died . . . because the Court found itself unable to draw determinate 
lines to define the exclusive sphere of state authority into which national power might 
not enter. That problem applies equally, however, to attempts to define and police an 
exclusive sphere of National authority; it thus plagues the contemporary cases in 
which courts have sought to keep states out of ‘uniquely federal’ fields like foreign 
affairs . . . or immigration.  
Id. at 3. 
 174.  239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
 175.  Id. at 42–43. 
 176.  Id. at 42. 
 177.  Erin F. Delaney, Note, In the Shadow of Article I: Applying a Dormant Commerce 
Clause Analysis to State Laws Regulating Aliens, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821, 1845 (2007). 
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argued, most of these rules regulating aliens can impact “where and 
how noncitizens live.”178 
Apart from its internal weakness, the Court’s attempt to maintain 
a sphere of state power looks even less persuasive given the foreign 
affairs rationale, which is capacious, especially in light of increasing 
globalization.179 Due to the fact that most every immigrant is from a 
foreign country, most any state regulation that affects aliens 
(regardless of its substance) can be seen to have a connection to 
foreign affairs,180 thus threatening the national interest and justifying 
constitutional preemption even in the absence of federal action.181 The 
application of this reasoning reached its zenith (or nadir) in Zschernig 
v. Miller,182 a case challenging an Oregon law that required personal 
property of a decedent in Oregon to escheat to the State, rather than 
go to a nonresident alien, unless reciprocal rights to inherit were 
provided for American citizen-heirs in foreign countries.183 The Court 
found it “inescapable that the type of probate law that Oregon 
enforce[d] affect[ed] international relations in a persistent and subtle 
way[,] . . . impair[ing] the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign 
policy.”184 It is of some question what actual effect probate laws in 
Oregon would have had or did have on foreign affairs, and the case is 
seen as an exemplar of the sweeping reach of the foreign affairs 
rationale behind the federal plenary power over immigration.185 
The Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution did little to affect 
immigration; given immigration’s connection to foreign affairs, an 
area in which “the states do not exist,”186 it is hardly surprising that 
 
 178.  Cox, supra note 139, at 389. 
 179.  Young, supra note 173, at 35 (“In our increasingly globalized world, no governmental 
actor—including states and even localities—can avoid interacting with the rest of the world in a 
way that implicates national foreign policy.”). 
     180.    See Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 9 VA. L. REV. 601, 626 (2013) (“If the 
Court characterized the statute in question as involving ‘foreign affairs,’ it would fall; if not, it 
would stand. But almost any regulation of immigrants could in theory affect ‘foreign affairs,’ so 
the scope of this use of plenary power was constantly shifting.”). 
 181.  Legomsky, supra note 171, at 262 (“The connection between immigration and foreign 
policy derives ultimately from the fact that an immigration decision operates on the subject of a 
foreign state. Because a foreign state may intervene diplomatically on behalf of its nationals, an 
adverse decision carries the potential for international tension.”). 
 182.  389 U.S. 429 (1968).  
 183.  Id. at 430–31. 
 184.  Id. at 440. 
 185.  See Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 832, 836 (1989) (“No one of [the Court’s] conclusions is effectively supported by the 
facts in the Zschernig case.”). 
 186.  LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 149–50 
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there was little effort to impose on the immigration power the type of 
federalism constraints seen in the evolution of the commerce clause 
doctrine.187 The constitutional limitations have not prevented scholars 
from making policy-based arguments, encouraging Congress to 
empower the states to take action, or arguing that states may be 
better placed to address immigration related issues, such as promoting 
integration188 or identifying labor needs.189 
Although not as relevant to the European Union, it is important 
to note that the plenary power doctrine has also put pressure on the 
relationship between Congress and the Executive: If the general 
power over immigration is grounded in the sovereignty of the federal 
government, can it be confined to Congress? How should executive 
power be analyzed?190 And finally, the link between foreign affairs and 
the political question doctrine has allowed and perhaps encouraged 
the federal courts to give Congress tremendous leeway in its actions 
in the immigration sphere.191 The doctrine’s influence on judicial 
review has rightly caused considerable outrage among scholars and 
others in the United States, as congressional action has been insulated 
 
(2d ed. 1997).  
 187.  E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995). 
 188.  Rodríguez, supra note 135, at 581. 
 189.  Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. 
L. REV. 787, 833 (2008). Identifying labor needs—particularly in terms of numbers—is a 
responsibility often exercised at the subnational level of federations. In addition to the EU, 
Germany and Canada have decentralized labor structures. See Jeffrey Sack, U.S. and Canadian 
Labour Law: Significant Distinctions, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 241, 242 (2010) (“In Canada, 
labour relations is mainly a provincial responsibility, with only 8.4% of the work force under 
federal jurisdiction.”); Conny Wunsch, Labour Market Policy in Germany: Institutions, 
Instruments and Reforms Since Unification (University of St. Gallen Dept. of Economics 
Discussion Paper No. 2005-06, 2005) at 14, available at http://www1.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp 
2005/DP-06_Wu.pdf (describing how a 2002 reform of German labor market policy placed more 
power in the hands of subnational labor offices to set needs according to local market 
conditions). 
 190.  See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 
YALE L.J. 458, 464 (2009) (explaining how the President can implement “remarkable change” in 
immigration policy even in the absence of congressional action); Christopher N. Lasch, How the 
Court’s Upholding of Federal Immigration Enforcement Authority in Arizona v. United States 
Casts Doubt on the Validity of Federal Immigration Detainers, 46 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 58–60), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178524 
(discussing how implications of Arizona (and plenary congressional power) might affect 
executive program of immigration detainers); Neuman, supra note 107, at 1840 (discussing 
uncertainty about the distribution of immigration power between Congress and the President). 
 191.  See Legomsky, supra note 171, at 262 (“[I]t ignores reality to hold that every provision 
concerned with immigration, as applied to every fact situation it might encompass, is so 
intimately rooted in foreign policy that the usual scope of judicial review would hamper the 
effective conduct of foreign relations.”). 
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from meaningful rights review.192 
*  *  * 
The federal plenary power over immigration is largely rooted in 
the connection between immigration and foreign affairs. The early 
rationales for federal power have shaped the current constitutional 
understanding of the immigration power and the way in which it has 
constructed federal-state relations. The link between immigrants, 
necessarily from foreign countries, and foreign relations is a powerful 
justification for exclusive federal action—whether under a theory of 
collective action federalism (or subsidiarity), or due to the federal 
government’s inherent sovereignty. Because both theories are tied up 
in the evolution of the doctrine, it is difficult to identify the weights 
accorded to each.193 Nevertheless, given that a theory of subsidiarity 
contributed in some way to locating immigration power in the United 
States, there are possible lessons for the European Union as it faces a 
similar question. 
III. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE FUTURE OF EU IMMIGRATION 
REGULATION 
Because the European Union and the United States are systems 
of enumerated powers, the Commission in the European Union and 
the Supreme Court in the United States have needed to provide 
reasons for allocating power over immigration at the federal (or 
supranational) level. As demonstrated in Part II, the choice of 
rationales can have significant effects in constructing the ongoing 
relationship between the central level and the states in the 
immigration policy area, creating a path dependency that may be hard 
 
 192.  See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: 
Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1615 (2000) (“[The plenary power] 
doctrine, which has effectively insulated federal immigration statutes from constitutional review, 
has long fascinated academic commentators.”); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign 
Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 703 (2002) (“Pronouncements from the Court in the 
field of immigration law are replete with statements that would shock the sensibilities of the 
domestic constitutional lawyer.”); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive 
Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 987–88 (1998).  
 193.  It is certainly true that current immigration scholars pay less attention to the 
subsidiarity or collective action federalism rationale. See generally Lindsay, Immigration as 
Invasion, supra note 153 (focusing on the transition from the commerce clause rationale to the 
inherent sovereignty rationale, and describing the inherent sovereignty rational as one of 
“national security”). But cf. Abrams, supra note 180, at 611–18 (discussing the differences 
between what she describes as structural preemption—the federal interest in immigration—and 
the plenary power—focused on the political interests in foreign affairs). 
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to escape.194 In Europe, the Commission and the national parliaments 
are at a critical juncture: What types of justifications for central action 
over immigration will be found persuasive? The nature of the United 
States experience is historically contingent and raises some issues, 
such as sovereignty of the national federal state, that are unmatched 
in the European context. Nevertheless, the role that the foreign affairs 
justification has played in the United States can serve as a cautionary 
tale to Member States of the European Union. This section outlines 
some of the possible lessons for the European Union from the United 
States and makes a preliminary assessment of the likelihood of the 
emergence of a European “plenary power” over immigration. 
*  *  * 
The underlying foreign affairs rationale for federal plenary power 
over immigration in the United States in part rested on a theory of 
federalism akin to that of subsidiarity. The Supreme Court used the 
logic of federalism and the threats of hold-outs and collective action 
problems to reinforce the argument that the federal government 
should have power over immigration. This parallelism alone should 
encourage Member States to assess whether the expansive nature of 
the foreign affairs construct might be replicated in the EU. But there 
are additional reasons specific to the European Union that reinforce a 
linkage between foreign policy and immigration regulation. 
The Commission has long advocated a connection between 
international development policy and migration,195 and thus, as a 
political matter, foreign policy is seen by some as tightly connected to 
immigration regulation. As discussed in Part I, in the European 
Union, the Commission reflects the “Comprehensive” or “Global 
Approach” to immigration.196 This approach categorizes asylum and 
immigration policy as a foreign policy issue, rather than as a matter of 
 
 194.  There are, of course, differences between judicial reasons and legislative reasons. The 
flexibility inherent in legislative reasoning, without the constraints of stare decisis, weakens the 
path-dependent nature of the Commission’s constructs. There remains power (and potential 
threat) in the Commission’s determinations, however, both in terms of structuring the dialogue 
on subsidiarity and because the ECJ has stated that when reviewing subsidiarity issues, it will 
look to the Commission’s rationales (as provided in its impact statement). See supra note 104 
and accompanying text. 
 195.  As early as 1994, the Commission argued that “if migration pressures are not 
adequately managed through a careful cooperation with the countries concerned, it is easy to 
predict the risk of friction to the detriment of international relations and the immigrant 
population itself.” Communication from the Commission to the Council and European 
Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, at 6, COM (94) 23 final (Feb. 23, 1994). 
 196.  See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.  
DELANEY 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2013  7:27 PM 
2013] JUSTIFYING POWER 191 
domestic policy, even a European-wide domestic policy. Scholars have 
indicated some confusion about how exactly the Comprehensive 
Approach is developing at the EU level. As Joanne van Selm has 
asked: “Is asylum and immigration becoming a foreign policy matter? 
Or is foreign policy being used for asylum and immigration policy 
ends? Or are asylum, immigration, and foreign policies becoming one 
single entity?”197 To the extent it is the foreign policy rationale that 
gives the Commission power to promote its approach to immigration, 
the answer to van Selm’s question is irrelevant. Under any view, 
power could accrue to the supranational level. 
The politics of international development and its relation to 
migration further complicate the first-order question of allocating 
power. The danger of subsidiarity analysis is that it can “collapse the 
constitutional question (‘What [is permitted]?’) into a policy question 
(‘What [is desirable]?’).”198 Those states that wish for integrated 
asylum, migration, and development policies may well prefer that 
action be taken by the Commission. If the Commission has support 
among Member States for its policy position, Member State 
parliaments are unlikely to push back based on subsidiarity 
concerns.199 Of course, this assumes a unified policy position in a given 
Member State, and as scholars have shown, the interests in a 
disaggregated state can be in opposition (the interests of a Member 
State’s executive power represented in the Council could conflict with 
those of that Member State’s parliament reviewing decisions on 
subsidiarity grounds).200 Nevertheless, the influence that policy 
preferences will have on subsidiarity determinations may be sizable.201 
 
 197.  van Selm, supra note 38, at 143, 145.  
 198.  Young, supra note 173, at 17. 
 199.  See Ritzer et al., supra note 56, at 757–58 (“[I]n parliamentary democracies such as the 
German, the government’s parliamentary majority will rarely oppose legal acts of the 
Community that have been endorsed by the government, even in terms of subsidiarity.”). 
 200.  See Lavenex, supra note 100, at 331 (“The ‘escape to Europe’ rather results from a 
‘new raison d’Etat[,]’ which consists in the strengthening of particular governmental actors and 
their preferred policy agenda over other parts of the domestic consistency, including other 
sections of the public bureaucracies, but also parliament, political parties[,] or courts.” (citation 
omitted)); see also Andreas Ette & Thomas Faist, The Europeanization of National Policies and 
Politics of Immigration: Research, Questions and Concepts, in THE EUROPEANIZATION OF 
NATIONAL POLICIES AND POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION 3, 8 (Thomas Faist & Andreas Ette eds., 
2007) (identifying “opportunity afforded to national bureaucrats to circumvent political 
constraints on the national level by shifting to the new venue the European level offered”).  
 201.  In the United States, immigration politics do not necessarily overlap with the debate 
over allocation of power. While some states seek more immigration power in order to institute 
restrictive policy—such as Arizona’s SB 1070—certain states promote federalism in order to 
enact more permissive legislation, as in Maryland’s recent DREAM Act. Nick Anderson & Luz 
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The expansive logic of foreign policy as an appropriate arena for 
central-level control and the possibility that Member State 
immigration policy preferences might be more easily achieved at the 
European level will combine to exert a tremendous pressure for 
Union-level competence over an expanding portfolio of immigration 
issues. But it is safe to assume that some level of Member State 
involvement in immigration-related regulation is both necessary, 
given that few federal systems are able to operate immigration 
systems without local involvement, and desired, due to the Member 
States’ historic reluctance to cede power over immigration to 
Brussels. What might serve as a countervailing force? 
The drafters of the Early Warning System hoped this mechanism 
would serve to protect the interests of the Member States. Thus far, 
however, subsidiarity review by the national parliaments has been 
tepid. As the Commission reported in 2012, in “none of the 2011 cases 
were the thresholds for triggering the yellow or orange cards met . . . . 
[T]he vast majority of the 28 legislative proposals on which national 
Parliaments issued reasoned opinions in 2011 elicited at most three 
reasoned opinions.”202 The attention by national parliaments to 
subsidiarity issues had increased by seventy-five percent over that in 
2010 (the time of the Seasonal Workers Directive)—but the actual 
numbers of reasoned opinions remain low.203 An additional concern 
lies in the inattention of the national parliaments to the foreign policy 
rationale used by the Commission. 
As noted in Part I, the reasoned opinions against the Seasonal 
Workers Directive did little to contradict the arguments advanced by 
the Commission on the grounds of foreign policy.204 One way of 
limiting the power of the rationale would be for the national 
parliaments to demand that the Commission provide a specific nexus 
between the immigration regulation and a particular foreign policy 
proposal that it supports.205 In the case of the proposed Directive, the 
 
Lazo, Md. Voters Approve ‘Dream Act’ Law, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2012), http://articles. 
washingtonpost.com/2012-11-06/local/35506258_1_tuition-discount-college-students-neil-c- 
parrott; see also Delaney, supra note 177, at 1824–25 (recognizing the indeterminacy of the 
question of which level of government—state or federal—is more likely to enact discriminatory 
legislation). 
 202.  Subsidiarity Report 2011, supra note 103, at 4. 
 203.  Id. at 9 (identifying only “[sixty-four] opinions were reasoned opinions within the 
meaning of Protocol No 2, notifying a breach of the principle of subsidiarity”). 
 204.  See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.  
 205.  In the American context, Peter Spiro effectively does just this in his challenge to the 
foreign affairs justifications of amici in the Arizona case. See Peter Spiro, Why “One Voice” 
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Commission argued that foreign policy considerations require 
supranational action, in part because third countries have been 
waiting for this type of uniformity in the area of seasonal 
employment.206 Presumably, therefore, with the Seasonal Workers 
Directive in place, the Commission would be better able to negotiate 
migration issues with those non-EU states and could do so more 
efficiently than the Member States acting individually. The problem, 
which Anna Kocharov has noted, is that the proposed Directive 
regulates TCNs in general terms, undifferentiated by nationality. Third 
countries are most likely to negotiate in order to seek benefits that 
accrue to their own nationals; it is far from clear how the proposed 
Directive will advance any of the Commission’s plans for improving 
relations with (or conditions in) specific third countries.207 
Furthermore, in its reasoned opinion responding to the proposed 
Directive, the Dutch Legislature argued that the Commission’s 
proposal offered “no added value for making joint agreements with 
countries of origin regarding seasonal employment.”208 The 
implication, though not stated, was that individual Member State 
action had been taken and was effective in that regard.209 
The American experience should be viewed as a cautionary tale, 
and national parliaments concerned about protecting Member State 
power over immigration should pay more attention to the arguments 
presented by the Commission. The Commission’s foreign policy 
 
Shouldn’t Trump Arizona’s, OPINO JURIS, http://opiniojuris.org/2012/04/23/why-one-voice-
shouldnt-trump-arizonas-or-why-madeleine-albright-is-wrong-about-sb-1070/ (last visited Mar. 
27, 2013) (arguing Arizona’s SB 1070 does not hurt national foreign policy and thus finding little 
justification for an assertion of implied federal preemption). 
 206.  See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 207.  Anna Kocharov, Subsidiarity After Lisbon: Federalism Without a Purpose?, in 
DECONSTRUCTING EU FEDERALISM THROUGH COMPETENCES, EUI WORKSHOP 
PROCEEDINGS 7, 18–19 (June, 14 2011), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/ 
2012/10631.pdf. 
 208.  Statement from the Eerste Kamer and the Tweede Kamer [Senate and House of 
Representatives], Subsidiarity Test of the Proposal for a Directive Concerning the Conditions for 
Access to and Residence in the EU of Subjects of Third Countries, with a View to Seasonal 
Employment, Oct. 14, 2010 (Neth.), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general 
/relations/relations_other/npo/netherlands/2010_en.htm. 
 209.  It is unclear whether individual Member State action has been taken. There is certainly 
a willingness on the part of other countries to negotiate such agreements. See, e.g., Ministry of 
Economic Development, Arab Republic of Egypt, Prospects of Deeper Integration with the 
European Union Through the Movement of Natural Persons (2010), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-1239120299171/ 
5998577-1254498644362/6461208-1300395860273/Egypt_Rep.53733.pdf (outlining possible 
negotiation positions for the Government in Egypt that would facilitate the creation of 
temporary labor migration agreements with individual EU countries). 
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justification may serve to encourage further creeping competence in 
the immigration realm. But the extreme result of the American 
system—the ouster of state action in many spheres of immigration-
related regulation—is an unlikely end point for the European Union. 
For one reason, the Lisbon Treaty provides a textual limit on the 
Union institutions’ power, by giving the Member States the authority 
to decide on volumes of admissions in Article 79(5). The logic of 
subsidiarity and foreign policy cannot override the express provision 
of retained power in the Treaty. Even if creeping competence and 
central level power expansion shift much of the power, the Member 
States will have more flexibility for action than do the states in the 
United States. 
Finally, to the extent that the national sovereignty aspect of the 
justification plays a significant role in driving the American doctrine, 
the Commission has few European powers to rely on in parallel and 
the Member States retain key national foreign policy powers. 
Although the Lisbon Treaty has conferred legal personality onto the 
Union,210 allowing it to take action as an entity on the world stage, and 
further empowered a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy,211 the European Union does not share the inherent 
sovereign powers in the United States identified by Justice Miller.212 
The EU does not have war powers or the machinery to conduct war,213 
and European-wide decisions tied to these aspects of sovereignty are 
concluded intergovernmentally, by agreement among the Member 
States in the Council. Most high-level decisions on major questions of 
sovereign power are still taken by each individual Member State, 
acting alone. 
 
 210.  TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 50, art. 47, at 41 (“The Union shall have legal 
personality.”). 
 211.  The Treaty of Amsterdam first created the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy (then named the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy), Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 37, art. J.8, at 13, and the Lisbon Treaty expanded the 
reach of the post, TFEU, supra note 14, tit. V, at 28 (“General Provisions on the Union’s 
External Action and Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy.”). 
 212.  See supra notes 164–69 and accompanying text.  
 213.  Despite its lack of war powers, the EU cooperates closely with NATO in military 
actions and crisis management. NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 
2013). In addition, the European Union has been working since 1999 to develop a European 
Rapid Reaction Force to act as a single EU military body. See Boyka Stefanova, The European 
Union as a Security Actor: Security Provision Through Enlargement, 168 WORLD AFF. 51, 59 
(2005) (“[I]nstability in the [Balkans] brought about efforts to streamline the security posture of 
the union by a capacity to address difficult security issues. In December 1999, the European 
Council decided to create an EU Rapid Reaction Force . . . .”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The European Union is at a critical juncture in the development 
of its particular brand of constitutional federalism in the immigration 
arena. The Lisbon Treaty made immigration a shared competence 
between the Member States and the supranational level, with the 
principle of subsidiarity designed to structure the allocation of 
specific regulatory power. In justifying its decision to take regulatory 
action, the Commission alluded to the implications immigration had 
for foreign policy concerns. This rationale for supranational power 
echoes that provided by the United States Supreme Court in the late 
1890s to support federal power over immigration. The Supreme 
Court’s decisions had doctrinal and practical implications for 
American federalism, leading to a situation in which states have no 
constitutionally protected role in the immigration system. To the 
extent Member States in the European Union are concerned about 
maintaining their role in immigration, they should be alert to the 
types of arguments the Commission is making to justify its power and 
should insist on a specific nexus between a proposed regulation and 
the Union’s foreign policy interests. 
At bottom, the European Union is unlikely to progress entirely in 
the American direction—individual Member States retain far more 
sovereign power than individual American states do, and perhaps 
than they ever did, notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s efforts to revive 
arguments about inherent state sovereignty.214 But just because the 
Union will not slide to the bottom of the American slippery slope 
does not mean that national parliaments, and Member States, should 
not be wary. Creeping competence has been a longstanding concern—
one explicitly addressed in the Lisbon Treaty—and the immigration 
power looks likely to accrue to Brussels. As a matter of policy 
preference, perhaps this is a good idea. As a matter of the future of 
Europe and the end goal of European union, perhaps this is a good 
idea. But for those Member States who think otherwise, the American 
experience sounds a warning. 
 
 
 214.  See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2514 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In 
light of the predominance of federal immigration restrictions in modern times, it is easy to lose 
sight of the States' traditional role in regulating immigration—and to overlook their sovereign 
prerogative to do so.”). 
